Tesco Bank

The Real Risk Behind Mini Shai-Hulud The latest “Mini Shai-Hulud” activity linked to TeamPCP is another reminder that software supply chain attacks are evolving far beyond simple malicious packages. What makes these campaigns particularly concerning is the growing abuse of trusted ecosystems: • Legitimate package namespaces • CI/CD pipelines • Developer identities • Publishing workflows • Dependency trust relationships According to recent reporting, the campaign impacted widely used npm packages within ecosystems such as TanStack, with malicious versions distributed through trusted workflows and compromised publishing processes. The broader issue here is not just malware.It is the weaponisation of trust at scale.Modern software supply chain attacks increasingly focus on: • Credential harvesting • CI/CD token abuse • Maintainer compromise • Automated propagation • Identity-driven intrusion paths Some reports also highlighted how attackers leveraged legitimate build infrastructure and trusted publishing mechanisms, making malicious activity appear authentic on the surface. From a CTI perspective, this reinforces why intelligence teams need to look beyond CVEs and traditional IOC collection. Organisations increasingly need visibility into: • Dependency concentration risks • Trust relationships across software ecosystems • CI/CD exposure • Third-party package governance • Maintainer and supplier compromise risks The challenge is no longer simply: “Is this package malicious?” It is: “Which trusted relationships could become an attack path?” That is where software supply chain intelligence becomes operationally important. #CyberThreatIntelligence #SupplyChainSecurity #OpenSourceSecurity #DevSecOps #CyberSecurity #ThreatIntelligence #SoftwareSupplyChain #CloudSecurity

As far as I can see, cybersecurity hiring currently has three major issues: 1. ATS-driven filtering over real capability Candidates are increasingly being filtered by keyword alignment rather than actual experience and business impact. People are getting rejected for roles they already perform in practice because their CV does not perfectly mirror a specific job description. Entire platforms now exist purely to help candidates optimise CVs for ATS systems before a human even reviews them. That alone says a lot about the current state of hiring. 2. Unrealistic “multifunctional unicorn” job descriptions Many cybersecurity job descriptions no longer reflect one realistic role. Organisations often expect a single person to simultaneously cover: • strategy • operations • engineering • threat hunting • governance • stakeholder management • testing • tooling • reporting • and incident support In some cases, job descriptions read more like an entire security function than a single position. 3. Restricting the talent pool through rigid location requirements While the industry continues discussing cyber skills shortages, many organisations are simultaneously narrowing their own hiring pool through strict on-site or hybrid expectations. Especially in specialised areas like CTI, experienced talent is already limited. Reducing opportunities geographically while also expecting highly specialised multi-domain expertise feels increasingly contradictory. The irony is that many highly capable cybersecurity professionals are adaptable people who can bridge technical, operational and business conversations together. Those qualities do not always translate neatly into keyword scoring systems or overloaded job specifications. Maybe the industry does not just need better candidates. Maybe it also needs to rethink how it hires them. Or maybe all of these combine. #CyberSecurity #CyberThreatIntelligence #ATS #Hiring #Leadership #TechHiring #CyberJobs

100%. The stuff that goes round in my head when I’m running is fascinating. 🤣🤣